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RECENT CASE NOTES
claims having such priority under the "laws of the States of the United
Stales." The decision in In re Pittsburgh Drug Co. is based upon the
interpretation which the Pennsylvania court gave to the state statute in
Platt v. Johnson, 168 Pa. 47, 31 Atl. 935. The case of Martin v. Orgain
arose in the Federal Court of Texas. For an interpretation of the Texas
statute see Marsalis v. Pitman, 68 Tex. Rep. 624, 5 S. W. 404. In re Pittsburgh Drug Co. and Martin v. Orgain are further distinguishable upon
the ground that the petition in bankruptcy was not the only breach, but
the lessee was in arrears and thus in default. The distinction that we
are attempting to make here is plainly shown by the Orgain case where
the recovery was limited to one year's rent as set out in the state statute,
whereas the lease itself was to extend for more than three years. See
also Lontos v. Coppard, 246 Fed. 803, another Texas case. See also 7 C. J.
295. The property passed to the trustee burdened with a valid lien, York
T. R. D.
Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 25 Sup. Ct. 481.
DRUGGISTS-SALE OF POISONS-PROXIMATE

CAUSE-The deceased sent

his 8-year-old son to the drug store of the appellant with the instructions
to obtain for him a bottle of carbolic acid in which he 6aid he wished to
wash his feet. The child obtained the acid from a clerk of the appellant
and delivered it to the deceased who drank it and died. The appellee is
the administratrix of the deceased and sues to recover for his death on
the ground that the appellant was negligent in selling the acid to the son.
She bases her claim on the assumption that the druggist was negligent in
the sale to the child and that the death proximately resulted from such
negligence. The jower court gave judgment for her for $5000 and the
appellant appealed. Held: Reversed. The sale of the carbolic acid to
the child was not the proximate cause of the death of the deceased and
hence no cause of action lies against the appellant. Riesbeek Drug Co. v.
Wray, Appellate Court of Indiana, April 2, 1930, 170 N. E. 862.
The law imposes upon a druggist the duty to conduct his business in
a manner so as to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of
others and druggists who perform this duty in such a manner as to cause
injury to others must respond in damages. Knoeful v. Atkins, 40 Ind.
App. 428, 81 N. E., 600. The legislature may regulate the sale of poisons,
and failure to comply with such statutes constitutes negligence per se.
Goodwin v. t owe, 67 Ore. 1. Some states have by statute prohibited the
sale of poisons to minors. See Nebraska Criminal Code, sec. 42. Indiana
has no statute prohibiting the sale of carbolic acid to minors. Even
though there be no statute prohibiting the sale of poisons to minors yet
there is a general rule of law which demands that a druggist shall exercise in every case that degree of care which the circumstances of the case
demand and for a failure to use such care he may be held liable under a
general negligence test, for any injury proximately resulting. There is
then some duty on a druggist dealing in dangerous drugs, irrespective of
statute.
There being a duty to use reasonable care in such sales it was for the
jury to decide whether or not there had been a breach of that duty. The
jury in the instant case might easily have found that such a sale to an
eight-year-old child constituted a breach of this duty. Even admitting,
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however, that the druggist was guilty of a breach of duty, in order to hold
him liable, it must be further shown that his breach of duty proximately
resulted in the injury complained of, namely, the death. McKibban V.
Baxter, 79 Nebr. 577.
According to the generally accepted theory of proximate cause the defendant's act must be the cause in fact or the causa sine qua non of the
injury. Westfield Gas, etc., v. Hinshaw, 22 Ind. App. 499, 53 N. E. 1069.
The sale of the acid here must have been the cause in fact of the death.
There was, however, an intervening cause, that being the suicide. The
suicide was an independent criminal act. It is well recognized that an
independent criminal act will break the chain of causation. The suicide
was such an intervening act as could not reasonably have been anticipated
here as the result of a sale of carbolic acid to the child, hence the suicide
broke the chain of causation.
There is another view of the question of proximate cause which has the
support of some very respectable authority. This view is a modern development and is rapidly gaining ground. According to this view the defendant's conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury when it subjects
the injured party to a hazard against which the law affords protection.
Grenn's Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) 142. This analysis raises
the question, What is the purpose of the rule of law that discourages the
sale of poisons to very young children? The answer is, of course, that the
purpose of such a rule of law is to protect the children themselves from
injury that would result to them if they were freely permitted to purchase and handle poisons. This rule is not contemplated to protect adults
into whose hands the poisons might come as a result of a sale to children.
Thus the rule of law here did not protect against the particular hazard
encountered, namely, the suicide of the deceased.
Under either analysis presented the court can be supported in its holding that the injury to the appellee did not proximately result from a
breach of duty by the appellant.
T. H. F.
HIGHWAYS-DEDICATION-AcCEPTANCE BY PUBLIC USER-In 1872 P Co.
had purchased an addition to their right of way from M. The deed contained a provision that a path across P's tracks should be kept open as
"other street crossings are kept open." M had himself received the land
with a reservation that the strip be kept open for road purposes. Later
P bound itself in an agreement with M that the crossing would remain
6pen. A path ran from the crossing to M's home. P had done all the
work of repairing the crossing and had kept it open continuously, cutting
trains across it. The path had been continuously used by the public but
from 1886-1896 and 1907-1909 the path was barred at the entrance to M's
land to keep cattle out of P's right of way. P sues to enjoin city from
using the crossing. Held: Land was dedicated and accepted by city thru
long use by the public. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Michigan City, 169 N.
E. 873. German Bank v. Brose, 69 N. E. 300, in accord.
To dedicate land to public use there must be an intention on the part
of grantor to dedicate, acted upon and accepted by the municipality or the
general public. Williams v. Milley, 16 Ind. 362. Gillespie v. Duling, 41
Ind. App. 217, 83 N. E. 728. The actual intention to dedicate need not

